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AGREAT deal of ambiguity attaches to the question as to themeaning of the term 'Hfe". The term "Hfe" has usually been
confined to biological phenomena ; "the initial question of Biol-
ogy", we are told, "is the nature and characteristics of living mat-
ter—the determination of that wherein 'livingness' consists."^ The
term "life" has been taken to be the characteristic quality which is
common to plants, animals and man and which distinguishes them
from all other things in nature. "Life", Prof. J. A. Thomson
warns us, is distinctively a biological concept and there is always a
risk in transferring it to other fields.- In its widest sense, "life" may
be defined from the biological point of view as the manifestation of
action and reaction between organism and environment. Or, as
Spencer puts it: "Life is the continuous adjustment of internal re-
lations to external relations." But this definition, Spencer thinks,
is abstract and to employ its more concrete equivalent we should
do well "to consider the internal relations as 'definite combinations
of simultaneous and successive changes' ; the external relations as
'co-existences and sequences' ; and the connection between them as
a correspondence. "•'' Even so the definition, Spencer adds, is one-
sided, inasmuch as it recognizes only the form and not the body of
our conception of life.. "That which gives the substance of our
idea of life is," he says, "a certain unspecified principle of activity.
The dynamic element in life is its essential element."* And this
dynamic element or principle of activity is, he maintains, unknown
and unknowable. What we are concerned with in science is alone
'J. Y. Simpson, "Biology", Enc\clo{^cdia of Religion and Ethics, \'o\. II, p.
622.
-"Life and Death". Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, \'ol. VIII, p. 1.
^Principles of Biologx, Vol I, p. 100.
*Ibid., p. 114.
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the phenomena of Hfe which are accessible to our investigations,
and this surface knowledge holds good within its own domain. Thus,
he argues, "The statement that the continuous adjustment of internal
relations to external relations constitutes Life as cognizable by us,
is not invalidated by the admission that the reality in which these
relations inhere is incognizable."^ Hence, for the purposes of
science, the above definition will suffice for our purpose, but he in-
sists that even so considered the definition should not include the
various abnormal manifestations, which do not properly come under
the term "life", though we may safely accept it as covering the
normal manifestations.
The "dynamic element", which is thus claimed by Spencer as
forming the essence of our conception of life, has perhaps found
explicit recognition in the writings of the Vitalists. They contend
that mechanical or physico-chemical concepts do not suffice for the
treatment of biological facts. Driesch, for example, postulates a
non-perceptual "vital agency", or, as he calls it, "entelechy", which
is associated with the organisms as distinct from what he regards as
non-living things. This "entelechy" directs the physico-chemical
processes in certain cases, so that their results are dififerent from
what they would have been apart from its intervention. This postu-
lated entelechy is "not a new elemental consequence of some con-
stellation", but it is supposed to be a genuine agent "at work". In
Driesch's view the "entelechy" is non-spatial in nature, autonomous
and without any seat or localization. It is immaterial and not
physical energy. Its function is to suspend and to set free, in a
regulatory manner, pre-existing faculties of inorganic inter-action.
Dr. J. C. Bose, the great Indian scientist, is decisive in his re-
jection of the theory of vitalism. A stimulus produces a certain
excitatory change in living substances and the excitation thus pro-
duced may express itself in either of the two forms of mechanical
or electrical response. In mechanical response the excitation pro-
duced expresses itself in a visible change of form as seen in muscle,
while in electrical response it expresses itself in certain electrical
changes, and not in any visible alteration, as in nerve or retina, and
while the mechanical mode of response is limited in its application,
the electrical form is universal. Bose further contends that the
mechanical and electrical modes of response are practically identical
in character, and that not only can the electrical mode of response
'^Ibid.. p. 123.
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take the place of the mechanical one, but that the former has this
advantage that it is applicable where the latter cannot be used. Now.
this irritabilitv' or responsiveness of the tissue, either in its mechani-
cal or electrical form, was supposed to depend on its physiological
activity, seeing that under certain conditions it could be converted
from a responsive to an irresponsive state, either temporarily, as
by anaesthetics, or permanently, as by poisons. From these facts
that a living tissue gives response, while a tissue that has been killed
does not. it was concluded that the phenomenon of response is
characteristic of a living organism. And, Bose thinks, from a con-
fusion of "dead" things with inanimate matter, it has been supposed
that inanimate matter must be irresponsive or incapable of being
excited by stimulation. "In irritability", writes Dr. A^erworn, "there
exists a phenomenon which, as was believed, distinguished all organ-
isms from lifeless bodies, and appeared to mock at a physico-chemi-
cal explanation. The unexplained conception of irritability, there-
fore, .... became the starting-point of vitalism or the doctrine
of I'ifal force, which in its most complete form asserted a distinct
dualism of living and lifeless nature The vitalists soon laid
aside more or less completely mechanical and chemical explanations
of vital phenomena, and introduced, as an explanatory principle, an
all-controlling, unknown and inscrutable force hypermechanique.
While chemical and physical forces are responsible for all phe-
nomena in lifeless bodies, in living organisms this special force in-
duces and rules all vital actions." In opposition to the vitalists'
assumption of the super-physical character of response Dr. Bose
urges that the necessity for maintaining such a dualism in nature
must, on theoretical grounds, fall to the ground if it can be shown
that similar effects obtain amongst inorganic substances also, and he
claims to have shown that not only the fact of response, but all those
modifications in response which occur under various conditions take
place alike in metals, plants and animal tissues. As a ground of his
contention, Dr. Bose parallelises these phenomena as exhibited in
the three classes of substances. He maintains that in a living animal
tissue under stimulation the wave of molecular disturbance is ac-
compam"ed by a wave of electrical disturbance. This characteristic
of exhibiting electrical response under stimulation on the part of
animal tissues is, he contends, not confined to it alone, but extends
to vegetable tissues in a like manner. In these cases Dr. Bose
^General Physiolngy, p. 18.
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claims to have shown that the same electrical variations as in nerve
and muscle are obtained. If we pass to inorganic substances, and
use experimental arrangements similar to those used in the case
of animal and vegetable tissues, we find the same electrical responses
evoked in metals under stimulation.'^ To establish this contention
Dr. Bose tries to show experimentally the similarity, nay the essen-
tial identity, between some of the phenomena and their modifications,
which are connected with their responsive character, in all cases,
animal, vegetable and metal. This is corroborated in the cases of
negative variation, relation between stimulus and response, efifect of
superposition, uniform responses, fatigue, staircase effect, in-
creased response after continuous stimulation, modified response,
diphasic variation, effect of temperature, effect of chemical reagents,
etc.®
As a conclusion drawn from the above considerations, Dr. Bose
observes : "Living response in all its diverse manifestations is found
to be only a repetition of response seen in the inorganic. There is
in it no element of mystery or caprice, such as we must admit to be
applied in the assumption of a hypermechanical vital force, acting in
contradiction or defiance of those physical laws that govern the
world of matter. Nowhere in the entire range of these response-
phenomena—inclusive as that is of metals, plants and animals—do
we detect any breach of continuity The study of processes
apparently so complex as those of irritability .... must be faced,
and their investigation patiently pursued, without the postulation of
special forces whose convenient property is to meet all emergencies
in virtue of their vagueness Amongst the phenomena of re-
sponse there is no necessity for the assumption of vital force. They
are, on the contrary, physico-chemical phenomena, susceptible of a
physical inquiry as definite as any other in inorganic regions.®'
"Irritability" is considered by Bose to be due ultimately to
"molecular responsiveness", and excitatory response to be "brought
about by the molecular derangem.ent consequent on stimulus, with
the subsequent self-recovery,"®" and he insists that similar excitatory
response is given even by inorganic matter under stimulation.
"Irritability or molecular responsiveness, therefore," observes Dr.
Tor an account of the experiments, see J. C. Rose, Response in the Living
and Non-Living, Longmans Green & Co.
^Ihid.
^^Ibid., pp. 189-190.
^''See Plant Response, Longmans, Green & Co., p. 741.
.j ... i .S>i._iJ
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Bose, "must be regarded not as characteristic of organic substances
alone, but as the universal property of matter. In the case of what
is commonly known as the living, we have merely higher complexi-
ties, with greater instabiUties, of molecular structure. External
stimulus is here liable to induce greater derangement, and the ir-
reversible molecular change known as death takes place the more
easily, the more highly organized the complexes may be In
studving the responsive phenomena of living organisms, therefore,
we must fix our attention on their molecular aspect, and try to
follow out the physico-chemical changes which are consequent on
the molecular derangement induced by stimulus."^
So far as physical science goes, I think Bose has perhaps sufficient
justification in resisting the vitalists' conception of life, which seems
to be one-sided and insufficient.^" The vitalists' notion of an
"entelechy" as solely thwarting or holding in abeyance the so-called
mechanical processes of the organism, as if the mechanical processes
were simply blind and entirely at the mercy of the entelechy, seems
to be contrary to ascertained fact, and from the point of view of
science it can hardly be sustained. In an essay on "Life and Mtal
Energy" which forms the introduction to Rudolph Wagner's
Handzcorterbiich dcr Physiology, Lotze long ago contended for what
is called the mechanical view to a place in the science of physiology.
In criticising the theory of vitalism as a scientific principle or doc-
^Ibid., p. 741.
^°Recent scientific researches in biology and physiology confirm in essence
the contention that a physico-chemical explanation of vital fadts holds good
so far as science is concerned ; e. g., Dr. J. S. Haldane holds that a "mechanistic
theory of life" is correct so far as it goes, and that the two great physical laws
of the conservation of matter and of energy can he justifiably extended to all
living organisms, including human beings. Or, in other words, scientifically
regarded, however complex the changes involved in organic activity may be,
they are, at any rate, changes in a material system. Hence, in a sense, biology
may be regarded as the physics and chemistry of organisms, i. e., vital or or-
ganic changes are physico-chemical changes. Thus among the biologists and
physiologists the prevailing opinion is growing in favour of the mechanistic
theory as supplying a clear working hypothesis without the postulation of a
vital force. (See Mechanism, Life and Personality, Lee. I.) In the same
strain Prof. R. F. A. Hoernle, Dr. J. Johnstone, L. J. Henderson, etc., hold
that so far as science is concerned the mechanistic theory of life oiitains equally
in both the domains of the so-called "organic" and "inorganic"'. In Dr. John-
stone's view, as science is concerned only with the description of "givcness",
and a "givcnness" is but one, though we arbitrarily divide it into two domains
of the organic and inorganic, there can only be one way of describing it ami
that way is the mechanistic one. (See f^hilflsflphy and Biolofiy, Tntro.) Simi-
larly, Prof. Hoernle maintains that if we abstract from a scientific description
of the i)henomena of life its Ideological character, then what arc called '"organ-
ism" and "machine" both alike can be analysed and their changes described in
physico-chemical terms. (Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, Chap. VI.)
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trine, Lotze's main contention is that however peculiar, what the
vitaHsts call, the principle of Life may be in itself, it can never be
free from interaction with that same matter which is known to Uh
to be subject to physical laws of its own, and that the conclusion
which the facts suggest is that the phenomena of Life arise out of
a special combination of material elements, no one of which has any
claim to be called exclusively or pre-eminently the principle of life.
But in Lotze's view the mechanical view, though true, can in no
sense be regarded as final." I shall, however, try to show that the
theory of vitalism has perhaps some value from the point of view of
philosophy. No doubt, the definition of life ofifered by Spencer as
the "adjustment of internal relations to external relations" is only a
formal one, i. e., it describes only the occurrences that tak^ place be-
tween the organism and the environment, but that which Spencer
called the material aspect of the conception of life and which he
perhaps rightly thought to form the essential feature of the con-
ception, lies in the principle of activity of w^hich these occurrences
are manifestations. It is with the occurrences that science may be
said to be concerned, and philosophy with the active principle, and
Dr. Bose is considering the matter from the scientific point of view.
His view of life as consisting in "response to stimulus" may be said
to correspond in certain respects to the formal definition of life
given by Spencer. According to Dr. Bose, as we have seen, the re-
sponsive action, or, as he calls it, "irritability", is "ultimately due to
molecular Tesponsi^'eness and excitatory response is brought about by
the molecular derangement consequent on stimulus with the sub-
sequent self recovery." Or. in Spencer's words, it may perhaps
be said that the internal relations are adjusted to external relations
in an act of response. But so far only is there agreement. The
intimate connection, nay the essential identity, between physical and
physiological phenomena of response which Bose has attempted to
prove, and in which he finds the strongest ground for attributing
life to the so-called "inorganic", would find no support from Spencer
and the physiologists who adhere to the division of nature into "or-
ganic" and inorganic."
This, however, is but one side of the story. The other side con-
i^Lotze's contention is now upheld by Dr. J. S. Haldane, Prof. R. F. A.
Hoernle, Dr. J. Johnstone, L. J. Henderson, etc., who, though advocating a
universal maintenance of the mechanistic theory of life so far as scientific
description is concerned, do not regard it as, in any way, the final, nay it is.
according to them, wholly insufficient and erroneous as a final explanation of
the phenomena of life.
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sists in trying to discern what lies behind these processes or mani-
festations, for, as Kant said, "life means the capacity to act or
change according to an internal principle." This side of our con-
ception of life may be said in Spencer's words to form the material
aspect or the "body" of such a conception. The internal principle is
perhaps what Spencer meant by the "dynamic element" or the
"principle of activity", or in the vitalists' phraseology "entelechy",
of which the processes of life may be said to be manifestations.
The true justification for any such conception as this must be fur-
nished, if at all, by philosophy. But for a fuller or more complete
understanding of what we mean by life we must take into consider-
ation both the sides and try to understand the one in the light of the
other. The contention of Bose that the law of conservation of
energy holds good in the action and reaction between the organism
and the environment, as it obtains elsewhere, and that it introduces
no mystical power such as would in any part thwart or place in
abeyance the action of forces already operative, thus evinces itself
in its true light. Prof. J. A. Thomson writes: "In the domain of the
inorganic there is little individuality, no apparent freedom of action,
no endeavour, no purposiveness, no learning in the school of time.
But its uniformity has been a probably indispensable fulcrum for
the lever of will."^- The mechanical law of the conservation of
energy has been maintained to hold good only in the realm of what
is called inorganic nature. Dr. Bose, on the other hand, has tried to
show that this law holds good in both the domains of the so-called
"organic"" and "inorganic". It should be o1)served that Bose's ex-
planation is. in no sense, materialistic. Quite the contrary. The
drift of his thought is towards spiritualism and he all along tries to
dispose of the conception of "dead matter". How then are we to
understand Bose's position? I think in this way. It has been cus-
tomary to describe the workings or actions of the so-called "in-
organic" things in nature as simply blind and mechanical and as
taking place solely in accordance with mechanical laws. But this
may be said to be rather an assumption than a statement of fact.
The admission tha*" "insignia of life have not yet been discerned
cither wholly or in tlicir proper perspective" perhaps corrobor-
ates tin's view. The action and reaction which takes place alike be-
tween the organism and its environment and a so-called "thing" and
its environment, or as Bose calls it its responsive action, consists in
^•Systi'in of Animate Nature, p. 75.
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molecular rearrangement, i. e. every particle plays a part in the re-
sponsive action, and while Bose insists that there is no necessity of
introducing a vital principle to explain this fact, the statement should
be taken with reserve. As a scientist Bose may be said to be con-
cerned only with the phenomenal side of the problem of life, and
from this point of view, what he urges may be true. Yet Prof.
Ward is perhaps right in holding that "the real agents, whose ap-
pearances alone constitute the physiologists' phenomena, must be
regarded as monads."^^ In other words, the rearrangement of the
molecules, in which the responsive phenomenon is said to consist, is
not something blind, but is a phenomenal manifestation of real
agents at work. The vitalists, while pointing to the all important
principle of activity or the ''entelechy" even in the sphere of the so-
called "living matter", leave unexplained what are called the mechani-
cal processes of the organism, which play, as we have seen, an im-
portant and essential part in what is called the phenomena of life.
In this respect it may be said that neither the mechanistic theory
nor vitalism is a sufficient explanation of the phenomena of life,
and while they are but one-sided accounts and in opposition with
each other, pan-psychism or monadism claims to be able to replace
both.
'^^Realm of Ends, p. 462.
